What are the eects of local credit institutions on the distribution of income? Why should local banking development matter for the level of inequality? We focus on how dierent dimensions of banking development and other characteristics of 103 provinces in Italy aect the level of inequality.
nineties, thus the extension of local access to credit is fairly recent and still highly heterogeneous across provinces. 6 A higher availability of local branches is extremely important to extend access to credit since distance matter in the collection and provision of funds (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Guiso et al., 2004) ; it is particularly dicult to deposit or borrow in a market other than the local one. The provincial dimension has not been extensively investigated given the diculty of nding micro level data with the necessary detail for each province. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study empirically linking provincial banking development to income distribution across Italian provinces.
Using panel estimation and data for 103 Italian provinces over the period 2006-2010, we nd that local banking development has a signicant negative eect on the Gini coecient and other measures of income inequality, i.e. higher banking development is associated with lower inequality. However, the detected signicant negative eect is not robust through the sample thus suggesting that the existence of potential non-linearities in the functioning of the nance-inequality nexus. When we split our sample according to geographical areas, the negative eect of banking development on inequality is, indeed, signicant only in the northern sub-sample. One possible explanation for the last result is the existence of a nonlinear relationship between nancial development and income inequality, depending on the level of development, given that the North of Italy is traditionally more industrialized and rich. I.e., as nancial development is costly to implement, we might expect that catch-up eects would start manifesting only after the income crosses a certain threshold value. To further analyse the non linear hypothesis, we test whether the eect of banking development on income distribution depends on the stage of economic development. We split the sample according to the level of per capita GDP in each province and nd evidence that banking development decreases income inequality only in the richer provinces, as conjectured. Our ndings are conrmed by employing a rolling regressions technique to show graphically the evolution of the coecient on nancial development when per capita GDP increases. The coecient becomes negative and signicant after a certain level of the median per capita GDP and after the nancial sector has achieved a reasonably high level of development. We, nally, explore other dimensions that might lead to a non linear relationship between nance and inequality by considering the level of unemployment, the level of education and an index of nancial dependence of the industrial sector.
United States (The World Bank, 2012) .
6 Between 1936 and 1985, in Italy the number of bank branches grew by 87% versus 1228% in the United States. By contrast, between the end of the 1980s and the late 1990s, that is, after the deregulation, it grew by about 80%, almost double than in the United States.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. Section 3 provides a general outlook on the history of local banking development in Italy and on the dynamics of income distribution across Italian provinces. Data and methodology are described in Section 4 and 5 while Section 6 provides the empirical results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Financial development and inequality: theories, evidence and channels Financial development is expected to enhance growth by enabling the ecient allocation of capital and reducing borrowing and nancing constraints. The issue of which segments of the population prot from the growth induced by nancial development has not been conclusively addressed and there are many potential channels to be considered. Higher economic growth leads to an expansion in the demand for labor and in the creation of new opportunities in small and medium-sized rms and in the informal private sector. Hence, it could benet the poor through the creation of more employment opportunities but it could also benet the entrepreneurs generating higher prot margin.
There are a number of possible channels linking nancial development and the distribution of income. Banerjee and Newman (1993) , Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) show that informational asymmetries produce credit constraints that are particularly binding on the poor because the poor do not have the resources to fund their own projects, nor the collateral to access bank credit.
Similar theories thus suggest a negative linear relationship between nancial development and income inequality showing that nancial market imperfections can perpetuate the initial distribution of wealth in the presence of indivisible investments. Financial development directly eases the opportunity of the poor to access banking services. If the poor do not have access to the credit markets, they are constrained from investing in more education and thus they are automatically excluded from the higher paying job market.
Financial development may allow lower income individuals to invest more in education thus reducing inequality. Galor and Zeira (1993) give theoretical insights on this education mechanism.
By ameliorating credit constraints, nancial development may also foster entrepreneurship and new rm formation. A second channel thus focuses on the ability of the poor to become entrepreneurs. Lower income individuals do not have the required amount of collateral to apply for bank loans. If banking development comes with an improvement in bank performance, we might see a decrease in the collateral requirements and in the borrowing costs that would allow an expansion of the access to credit to lower income segments of the population. Banerjee and Newman (1993) oer some foundations for this idea.
Financial development might also come in the form of increased eciency of the banking sector, for example through a decrease in the interest rates faced by rms on their loans. In this case, the eects of nancial development on the distribution of income would operate through an increased demand for labor by rms rather than through an increased access to credit by the poor. The reduced cost of capital would push rms to substitute capital for labor and to increase production that would in turn boost both the demand for labor and for capital. The increased demand for labor would directly and positively aect lower income workers. 7 Although the relation between inequality and nancial development could be linear, it is also possible that dierent mechanisms operate at dierent levels of development. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) describe how the interaction of nancial and economic development can give rise to a non linear relationship, specically an inverted U-shaped relationship, between income inequality and nancial intermediary development; i.e., nancial development could widen income inequality during the early period of development, then tend to lessen it as average income rises and more households gain access to nancial services. The distributional eect of nancial deepening is thus adverse for the poor at early stages, but positive after a turning point.
The empirical literature has provided evidence for the idea that nancial development has a signicant eect on the pattern of income distribution and reduces inequality. Many cross-country studies empirically assess the relationship between nancial development and the distribution of income in an economy by studying the evolution of national Gini coecients at the aggregate level. Li et al. (1998) explain variations in income inequality across countries and time in a sample of 49 countries over the period 1947-1994, by using standard measures of nancial development, such as the ratio of M2 to GDP, and nd a negative relationship between nancial development and the Gini coecient. Similarly, Clarke et al. (2006) nd that nance is negatively associated with the level of the Gini coecient using a panel estimator over the 1960-95 period in a sample of 83 countries. Beck et al. (2007) nd that there is a negative relationship between nancial development and the growth rate of the Gini coecient, which holds when controlling for real per capita GDP growth, lagged values of the Gini coecient, and a wide array of other country-specic factors, and when using panel instrumental variable procedures to control for endogeneity and other potential biases. They also nd that nancial development exerts a disproportionately positive impact on the relatively poor by boosting the growth rate of the income share of the poorest quintile beyond the impact on aggregate growth.
On a more disaggregated level, researchers have studied the impact on both households and rms.
For what concerns the impact on households, empirical research suggests that households benet signicantly from nancial development. General equilibrium models and natural policy experiments by looking at direct and indirect eects of nance, conclude that the indirect eects are prevalent in reducing inequality. Gine and Townsend (2004) suggest that increased access to nancial services has a negative impact on income inequality indirectly through the labor market. 8 The channel suggested is that nance reduces inequality by increasing the demand for labor in the long run, thus osetting the short run opposite eects.
One interesting and frequently used exogenous change in policy aecting the nancial sector is branch deregulation within a country. Burgess and Pande (2005) study the eects of branch deregulation, and the following improved access to nance, in India on the level of poverty in each state. Beck et al. (2010) assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income across the states of the United States. They nd that deregulation tightened the distribution of income by boosting incomes in the lower part of the distribution.
From the existing literature, it emerges that nance has a central role in explaining economic inequality, however the complete understanding of the particular mechanisms linking nance and inequality and in particular how formal nancial sector policies, in particular banking sector and securities markets regulations, aect inequality is still a gap in this eld. While theory focuses on the importance of broader access, i.e. nancial inclusion, there is relatively little empirical evidence linking access to nance to development outcomes. In particular, studies on the impact of nance on inequality within a country are still limited. However, if pro-poor nancial development requires expanding the access to nancial intermediation by a growing number of poor households, it becomes important to address the issue of what are the main obstacles that discriminate the poor from entering nancial intermediation. Theoretical models suggest many potential sources of nancial market imperfections, such as adverse selection, moral 8 They use surveys of Thai households from 1976 to 1996 and nd nancial liberalization and the increasing access to credit was able to explain the rapid growth of GDP in Thailand.
hazard, transactions costs, entry fees, connections. The relative importance of those potential sources of credit market imperfections could vary from one country to another, hence it becomes crucial to move from cross-country studies and look into country-level studies. Cross-country regressions are important to emphasize between country variation although it is the within country variation that can tell us more about how nance aects income distribution. Institutional and comparative analyses could better answer the economic question of how nance interacts with the real sector to alter the distribution of income in the economy.
Our study also relates to the literature that focuses on local banking development and its eects at a disaggregated level. Following other studies on local nancial development (Bonaccorsi Di Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Guiso et al., 2004; Benfratello et al., 2008) we study Italy, which provides an ideal setting, and focus on province-level data. Among other contributions that focus on the provincial level, Hester et al. (2001) use provincial data on banks and ATMs to study the eect of innovation in the banking sector on competition; Beretta et al. (2003) study the relationship between banks' internationalization and export propensity using data at Italian provinces level; Deloof and La Rocca (2012) nd that provincial banking development in Italy increases the provision of trade credit.
3 Local Banking Development and dynamics of income distribution in
Italy
The Italian nancial system is dominated by the banking sector, since the stock market's capitalization is still relatively small. The banking system itself is small if compared to the European counterparts.
At the end of 2010 total balance-sheet assets came to 2.5 times the country's GDP, compared with 3.3 times in Germany and Spain and 4.1 times in France. The same comparison holds if we involve other banking business indicators, such as the ratio of deposits and lending to GDP. 9 The Italian banking system today is the result of two important regulatory interventions. Guiso et al. (2003 Guiso et al. ( , 2004 show that these banking laws deeply aected local credit markets in the decades that followed. Second, the deregulation of the 1990s is one of the main determinant of the shape of the actual banking system in Italy. A decade of deregulation (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) , markedly changed the structure of the Italian banking system. Entry in the banking market was entirely liberalized in 1990, thanks also to the introduction of European directives about the coordination of banking regulations across the European Union. In 1993, a new banking law, incorporating the Banking European Directive, removed the separation between short and long-term lending. In 1994, the Government started to privatize all the major State-owned banks. The number of bank branches grew by 79 percent, almost twice as much the rate of growth of bank branches in the United States during the same period (43 percent). If we consider the average trend of inequality per macro areas (Fig.3) , we can notice that, although slightly declining in all areas, southern provinces on average show higher level of inequality than the northern ones. If from one hand, the more unequal distribution of income in the South might be actually lower than what the ocial gures show, due to a consistent portion of shadow economy, on the other hand, it raises many questions on the dierence in the economic structures within a country. 10 For what concerns our study, the latter is a dimension to take into account when studying the potential channels of interaction between nance and inequality. According to Istat (2012) , fewer employment opportunities and lower earnings for women, together with the job instability, are among the main causes of inequality while 50 percent of households received less than the median value of 24,673 euro (2,056 euro a month). at regional level, slightly less disagreggated than the provincial one. It is possible to notice that inequality tends to be substantially of low level when the level of banking development is high. We interpolate data using a weighted least squares method that provides a generally smooth curve, in order to have a more clear pattern in the graph, to reduce the spread of data and to see how the phenomenon occurs. Indeed, such preliminary considerations call for a deeper analysis of the potential interactions among nance, and particularly local banking development and inequality.
Note: Our calculations on Bank of Italy and Istat data for Italian regions. We arrange our data in order to obtain the distribution of taxpayers' income at the provincial level. The dataset specify the frequency and the average income of 18 income classes for each province and each year.
Starting from these data, we are able to compute the traditional indicators employed in the inequality literature. First, we derive the Gini coecient of income distribution from the Lorenz curve. Larger values of the Gini coecient imply greater income inequality. The Gini coecient is equal to 0 if everyone receives the same income, and it is equal to 100 if a single individual receives the income of the entire economy. As an alternative measure of income distribution, we compute the Theil index. Similarly to the Gini, the Theil index is also increasing in the degree of income inequality: if all individuals have the same income, the index is equal to 0, while the index is equal to ln(n), if one individual receives all of the economy's income, where n is the number of individuals.
The recent literature on the relationship between local banking development and economic growth has developed several indicators to proxy for the ability of nancial intermediaries to improve loan monitoring and screening. We concentrate on branch density by province (number of branches divided by population) as a measure of the level of development of the local credit markets. This is a standard measure used in the empirical literature on banking (see, e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) . The rationale behind the choice of this variable is, on one hand, the fact that physical proximity by increasing the capacity of collecting "soft" information, improves the quality of screening and monitoring of borrowers, making these actions less costly (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Presbitero and Rebelotti, 2013) . 12 On the other hand, branch density shows a large intra-provincial dispersion, as it is evident in Fig. 1 , and captures the dimension of banking development that is largely aected by the regulation and deregulation processes (see, Benfratello et al., 2008 , and Section 3). Data on branch density come from the Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Italy.
For some of the control variables, we use the information coming from the Istat website for what concerns per capita GDP, unemployment rate, female activity rate, population by provinces and regional percentage of school dropouts. The index of infrastructure endowment, that allows to control for some relevant factors that might dier across the macro areas of Italy but do not change over time, is instead taken from the Geoweb Starter database. Table 1 contains summary statistics at the regional level. 13 The data show that average income inequality, measured by Gini index or Theil index, is similar among the three Italian macro-areas (North, Center and South). Instead, the number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants is larger in the North 12 Furthermore, Bonaccorsi and Gobbi (2001) show that provinces with a high number of bank branches relative to their population have greater bank credit.
13 For a matter of space, we report the statistics at the provincial level in Table A .1 of the Appendix. Table 2 reports the correlation matrix. Gini and Theil index show a high positive correlation, meaning that they are capturing similar phenomena.
Per capita GDP shows a low correlation with the inequality indicators meaning that inequality is not necessarily driven by economic development.
Methodology
We use a panel specication to assess the relationship between local nancial development and income distribution, based on the following regression set-up:
with p = 1, ..., 103, t = 2006, ..., 2010. Y pt is a measure of income inequality (e.g., the logarithm of the Gini index or of the Theil index) in province p and in year t, C pt is a vector of time-varying province level control variables, E t is a vector of year dummies that account for year xed eects and ε pt are the error terms. The variable of interest is B pt , a measure of local nancial development (e.g., log of branch density)
in province p and in year t. The coecient b 1 , therefore indicates the impact of nancial development on income inequality. A positive and signicant b 1 suggests that nancial development increases income inequality, while a negative and signicant coecient indicates that nancial development mitigates the level of inequality. In total, by considering 103 provinces and ve years of data, we end up with 515
province-year observations' dataset that serves as the basis for much of our analysis.
As explained in Section 1, considering the provinces of a single country enables us to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias and to implicitly control for dierences in formal institutions. Moreover, including year-specic dummy variables allows us to control for nation-wide shocks and trends that shape income distribution over time, such as business cycles (e.g., the nancial crisis of [2007] [2008] , national changes in regulations and laws. Nevertheless, in testing for the eect of banking development on income inequality, we also account for the possibility that the two phenomena are jointly determined and that there might exist unobserved factors that are correlated with both. We address these endogeneity issues using an instrumental variable (IV) approach. Let I p be a vector of instruments that are correlated with local banking development but aect income inequality only through the banking channel. The eect of these instruments on B pt is captured by b 4 in the local banking development equation:
where C pt refer to the control variables in (1), I p is the vector of instruments, E t is the vector of year dummies and u pt are the residuals.
We rst estimate the empirical model in (1) with OLS. Then, we estimate the model (1)- (2) Italian provinces, the tightness of nancial constraints varies geographically. The regulatory system for bank entry in local credit markets was completely liberalized only towards the end of the 1990s. Guiso et al. (2004) demonstrate that these banking laws deeply aected local credit markets (creation and location of new branches) in the decades that followed 1936. Thus, we expect that this regulation shaped the local banking structure during the decades in which it was in place and that this impact persisted for several years after the removal of the regulation. Hence, we expect the 1936 banking regulation to be correlated with the current local banking development. As shown by Guiso et al. (2003 Guiso et al. ( , 2004 , the distribution of types of banks across provinces in 1936, and hence the constrictiveness of regulation in a province, stemmed from "historical accident". 14 In addition, the regulation was not designed looking at the specic needs of each province. The dierences in the restrictions imposed on the various types of banks were related to dierences in the connections of the banks with the Fascist regime. Therefore, the regulation is unlikely to have any direct impact on the income inequality nowadays.
We choose as instruments two of the four indicators that Guiso et al. (2004) employ to characterize the local structure of the banking system in 1936. These indicators are: the number of bank branches in the province (per 100,000 inhabitants) and the number of savings banks in the province (per 100,000 inhabitants). Based on the discussion above, provinces with more bank branches in 1936 and with relatively more savings banks should have suered less from the regulatory freeze.
After estimating the empirical model on the full sample, we split the data in three dierent subsamples corresponding to the three dierent geographical areas (North, Center, South) in which Italy is usually divided. In this part of the study we move to the main focus of our paper and study the existence of potential non-linearities in the functioning of the nance-inequality nexus. To further exploit the issue of non-linearity, we split again the sample according to the level of per capita GDP (i.e. below or above the median value). We nally use a rolling-regression technique that has been recently used in the literature on nance and growth. 15 In the rst part of our analysis, the split-up of the sample is obtained mostly through discrete measures that might suppress the actual non linear relationship between nancial development and other variables. The use of a rolling-regression framework by ordering the data according to the level of a variable of interest, for instance per capita GDP, can be thought as a continuous, rather than discrete, analysis.
We employ rolling-window OLS and 2SLS regressions with an initial window of 140 observations after ordering the data according to the variable of interest. For example, when using per capita GDP as the ordering variable, the initial regression includes the 140 observations with the lowest levels of per 14 In particular, the distribution of banking types reected the interaction between previous waves of bank creation and the history of Italian unication. For instance, the strong presence of savings banks in the North East and the Center stemmed from the fact that this institution originated in Austria and started to operate rst in the provinces dominated by the Austrian Empire (Lombardia and the North East) and in close-by states (especially Tuscany and the Papal States).
15 For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) apply the rolling-regression framework to look for ination thresholds in the nance-growth nexus while Yilmazkuday (2011) extends the analysis to gure out how non linear growth estimates and their signicance change if all the observations are ordered by a variable of interest.
capita GDP and rolls in additional observations one by one and rolls out the initial observations one by one, so that each coecient is estimated with a constant window size. The selection of a constant window size is important for comparison of coecients across the windows while the actual size of the window, i.e. 140 observations, is important to ensure a fair distribution across the power of the regressions and the degree of non linearity. These regressions give us also some insights on the potential mechanisms through which the nance-inequality nexus works. We summarize the results from the rolling-window regressions by plotting the coecient estimates of interest, i.e. the coecient on branch density, against the ordering variable.
Empirical results
This section describes the empirical results from the analysis. Table 3 indicates that local nancial development negatively aects the Gini coecient. Column 1 reports the results of a regression with only the log of branch density and the log of per capita GDP, while columns 2 through 6 provide regression results controlling for some province-level control variables, including a proxy for education (school dropout), a proxy for infrastructure, unemployment or female activity rate, self-employment. Column 7 reports the results from the 2SLS regression with all the controls, while columns 8 and 9 provide OLS and 2SLS regression results with the log of the Theil index as the dependent variable. 16 All the regressions include year-specic and geographical area dummy variables. As shown, nancial development enters signicantly in all the regressions. These ndings indicate that branch density tightens the distribution of income even when accounting for year xed eects and time-varying province-level factors. Moreover, we nd that a higher level of per capita GDP is associated with higher level of inequality. The nding of a positive direct eect of GDP on the Gini coecient, allow us to better isolate the impact of nancial development by itself on inequality.
Higher education, measured by the proportion of school dropouts, is associated with a lower level of inequality, conrming some of the implications of the Galor and Zeira (1993) model on the importance of education in the distribution of income. Higher unemployment rate is associated with higher income inequality, similar to what Beck et al. (2010) found for the US; alternatively, we also nd that a higher rate of female activity is associated with lower inequality.
The literature suggests that the eect of nancial development on inequality might be non linear (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990) . In Table 4 , we report regression results for subsamples of provinces, selected according to the geographical area (i.e. North, Center, South). 17 Regressions results depicted in Table 4 indicate that local banking development enters signicantly, and with the expected sign, only in the regression for the Northern provinces. The signs on the control variables are the same as in the case of the full sample besides the one referring to education and female activity rate. When considering the Center and South sample, the coecient on nancial development is not signicant anymore. Since the North of Italy is the area with the highest level of per capita GDP, the last nding could suggest that the eectiveness of banking development in reducing the level of income inequality varies according to the dierent stage of economic development. We further test this conjecture by splitting the sample according to the median per capita GDP (euro 25,816). We report the regressions results in columns 1 to 4 of Table 5 .
We nd that nancial development enters the regression signicantly and with a negative sign only when the level of GDP is higher than the median, thus conrming our conjecture that the nance-inequality nexus is non linear according to the dierent level of economic development. This hypothesis is also in line with some inuential theories about the relationship between nancial development and income inequality. The general equilibrium model developed by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) generates a nonlinear relationship between nancial development, income inequality, and economic development.
During the various stages of economic development, nancial development improves capital allocation, boosts aggregate growth, and helps the poor through this channel. However, the distributional eect of nancial development, and hence the net impact on the lower percentile of the income distribution, depends on the level of economic development. At early stages of development, only the rich can aord to access and directly prot from better nancial markets. At higher levels of economic development, many people access nancial markets so that nancial development directly helps a larger proportion of the society. In the specic case of our sample, we are probably capturing the behavior from the middle of the distribution on, when the level of economic development is suciently high to enable more segments of the population to have access to the nancial system.
In columns 5 to 8 of Sub-samples estimations Per capita GDP > 25, 816
Branches per 1,000 inhab ≤ 0.62
Branches per 1,000 inhab > 0.62
Gini (log) Gini (log) Gini (log) Gini (log) Gini ( median) aects the nance-inequality nexus. In particular, we split the sample according to the median of branch density (0.62 branches per 1,000 inhabitants). The results show that the eect of nancial development is signicant for both the sub-samples in the 2SLS regressions. However, the coecient of branch density is larger and more signicant for the provinces with a higher level of nancial development.
These results indicate that the nance-inequality nexus is more relevant in certain economic environments:
provinces with more developed nancial sectors or provinces with higher levels of per capita GDP have a stronger and signicant impact of nancial development on income inequality.
In Fig. 5 we address these issues of nonlinearity from a dierent perspective by using a rollingregression technique that has been recently used in the literature on nance and growth to study the issue of nonlinearity, as explained in Section 5. We employ rolling-window OLS and 2SLS regressions with an initial window of 140 observations after ordering the data according to the median level of per capita GDP the nancial sector needs to achieve a reasonably high level of development to reduce income inequality eectively, otherwise the nancial eects on inequality approach zero as nancial development decreases.
Independent of the regression model used, the coecient estimates of nancial development were found to be signicant for provinces with branch density approximately between 0.5 and 0.65 branches per 1,000
inhabitants. These results are in line with the ndings from the literature on nance and growth (King and Levine, 2003 and Wachtel, 2002) . 7 Non linearities in the nance-inequality nexus: the role of nancial dependence, education, unemployment
In the previous sections we assessed the positive contribution of nancial development in reducing income inequality. The basic theoretical idea behind it is that by ameliorating credit constraints, nancial development may foster entrepreneurship and new rm formation, thus aecting the labor demand, and may also reduce the particularly binding credit constraint on the poor given that the poor do not have the resources to fund their own projects and investment, as for example education, nor the collateral to access bank credit. The ideal setting for the following of our analysis would be to detect what are the channels underlying our ndings. Since we do not have the data with the necessary detail to conduct a proper analysis, we try to do some preliminary exploration of possible explanations. To do that we rely again on the study of potential nonlinearities in the operation of the nance-inequality nexus depending on other specic variables. We basically try to nd whether there are some third variables according to which the Non linearities: nancial dependence, education and unemployment
(8) Notes: The table reports regression coecients and associated standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variables and the estimation method are reported at the top of each column. The set of instruments includes: the number of bank branches in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhabitants) and the number of savings banks in the province in 1936 (per 100,000 inhabitants). The regressions include year-specic and geographical area dummy variables. *** signicant at 1%, ** signicant at 5%, * signicant at 10%. The table reports nance-inequality linkage works dierently. Similarly to the methodology described in section 5 and 6, we consider three dierent variables that we think interfere with the nance-inequality virtuous cycle, split the sample according to the median level of that variable and run two separate regressions. Then, we order the sample observations according to the level of the same variable and run rolling regressions.
The three variables that we use are an indicator of nancial dependence, the fraction of people with a secondary education degree and the unemployment rate.
Since data on the actual use of external nancing by the rms are typically not available, for nancial dependence we construct our own indicator starting from the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) . We took data on the industrial sectors composition of each province from the Italian Chamber of Commerce. We matched the Ateco 2007 codes with the International Standard Industrial Classication (ISIC) codes used in Rajan and Zingales. 18 We were then able to tabulate the fraction of rms in each province that show external nancial dependence, mainly concentrated in the manufacturing sector. We assigned to each Ateco code the value of the index of nancial dependence created by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and built our own indicator as a weighted average of the value of the index with weights given by the fraction of each type of industry in each province. The median level of our indicator is 0.258 and the results from the regressions on the two subsamples are reported in columns 1-4 of Table 6 . The coecient on branches density is negative and signicant only in the subsample of observations above the median level of nancial dependence. Similarly, in the upper panel of Fig. 6 we show that the coecient on branch density in the Gini regression becomes negative and signicant only after the level of nancial dependence exceed 0.25. We interpret the results of this simple exercise as a further evidence that nancial development is key to the mitigation of income inequality given that it is more eective when the need for nancial dependence is actually higher. Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that one way to check whether a channel is at work is to see whether industries that might be most aected by a channel grow dierentially in countries where that channel is likely to be more operative and they show that industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external nance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed nancial markets. We do a completely dierent test but somehow apply a conceptually similar reasoning. We tried to adapt the idea of external nance dependence to our context by testing whether nancial development aects the level of inequality dierentially at dierent level of nancial dependence and found that this is actually the case.
We conducted the same exercise by considering as a third variable of interest the level of education, that we proxy through secondary education achievements. We created this variable by looking at the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy and calculated the fraction of people with a secondary education degree in each province based on the surveys' answers. The median level in our sample is 0.32, meaning that the 32 percent of the population in the median province is holding a secondary education degree. The regressions results from the subsamples in this case are depicted in columns 5-8 of Table 6 . As in the previous case, we nd again evidence that the virtuos relationship between nancial development and inequality is in operation only in the subsample with observations of secondary education above the median. The results from the rolling regressions for this case are contained in the graphs of the center panel of Fig. 6 . Financial development coecient becomes negative and signicant after the level of secondary education is above 0.3. With this variable we are trying to catch the importance of education and more general of human capital. From a theoretical point of view, in terms of human capital accumulation, nancial imperfections might represent huge barriers to the poor purchasing education. Hence, higher nancial development meaning lower credit constraints, will reduce income inequality by allowing poor people to achieve high skills by borrowing and nancing education.
The fact that we nd a signicant coecient of banking development in reducing the level of Gini in association with relatively high level of secondary education seems to point in this direction.
Finally, we consider the unemployment rate. The median level in our sample is 5.84. Columns 9-12 of Table 6 refer to this part of the analysis. In this case nancial development has a negative and signicant value in the Gini regressions when the level of unemployment is below the median level. The same dynamics is conrmed in the rolling regressions graphs contained in the bottom panel of Fig. 6 . Basically, we nd that nancial development reduces the level of Gini in association with low unemployment rates. This result is in line with the expectations. In fact, as explained in Beck et al. (2010) , one of the main channels through which nancial development reduces income inequality is by boosting the relative demand for low-skilled workers. However, our results suggest that this channel is eective only for the provinces where the unemployment rate is below a threshold. With some caution, we link this result to the idea that banking development is operating on the labor demand side. Financial development reduces the cost of capital, thus leading rms to both substitute capital for labor and increase output which in turn increases the demand for capital and labor. We believe that the output eect dominates thus creating an increased demand for labor. This would explain why we nd that the virtuous circle nance-inequality works in association with low unemployment.
We are aware that this part of the analysis is just a preliminary exploration since each explanation needs independent investigation with individual-level longitudinal data sets and longer time series. Nevertheless, we provide this extension to further motivate and guide future research on potential mechanisms linking banking development and the distribution of income.
Conclusion
Financial development is expected to enhance growth by enabling the ecient allocation of capital and reducing borrowing and nancing constraints. However, this does not necessarily imply that nancial development reduces income inequality and it does not say anything about which segments of the population prot from the growth induced by nancial development. If it increases average growth only by increasing incomes of the rich, hence increasing income inequality, then nancial development will not help those with lower incomes.
In this paper, we empirically address the relationship between nancial development and income distribution by studying potential non linearities. In particular, we analyze the connection between local banking development, measured as branch density, and inequality across Italian provinces. Using panel estimation and data over the period 2006-2010, we nd that local banking development has a signicant negative eect on the Gini coecient and other measures of inequality, i.e. higher banking development is associated with lower inequality. When considering Italian macro areas sub-samples (North, Center, South), the result is signicant only for the North; thus suggesting that the relationship is non linear, depending on the level of development. Also, when the sample is divided in two sub samples according to the median level of per capita GDP, we nd a signicant eect of nancial development on inequality only in the sample where the level of income is above the median. These non linearities are further conrmed when we employ the rolling regressions technique and show graphically that the coecient on nancial development becomes negative and signicant after a certain level of the median per capita GDP and after the nancial sector has achieved a reasonably high level of development.
When we split the sample according to the indicator of nancial dependence, education and un- employment we nd additional evidence that the linkages between nance and inequality are not linear.
Financial development is signicant when the level of nancial dependence is above the median, when the proxy for education is above the median and when the unemployment rate is below the median. The last ndings are conrmed also when running rolling regressions.
The empirical evidence reported in this paper conrms the importance of nancial development for economic growth and takes one step further looking at the eect on the distribution of income. The main limitation of the current study is the availability of data. As explained in Section 4, the Italian Department of Finance publishes income data for each province only for the period 2006-2010, thus rather than the time dimension, we have exploited the spatial one and tried to capture eventual dierences in the functioning of nancial development across dierent territories of a single country. Financial development is usually expected to exert its positive impact in the medium and long run especially when it is connected to growth, that by denition is a long run phenomenon. Here we have a time span of ve years and we are not looking at the linkages between nance and growth but between nance and income distribution. The latter is also not a short run phenomena since it might involve some intergenerational mobility; however, it is fairly common in the inequality literature to rely on cross-sectional data more than on time series. Thus, our main focus is on how and under what condition the relationship changes in spatial terms across the dierent Italian provinces. The entire study could be thought of as a snapshot of the Italian situation.
We can certainly conclude that there are signicant dierences in the economic structures within Italy and that those dierences are aecting also the way income is distributed. Given the limited time span, our ndings at this stage are only suggestive. But they do indicate that nancial development, and in particular local banking development matters for the distribution of income.
One possible extension is to repeat the same analysis on a longer time period to see whether the general pattern is conrmed or the phenomenon that we are capturing is limited to a specic time period, that incidentally coincides for the most part with the Great Recession. Greater availability of data will also make possible to test more carefully what are the channels linking nancial development and inequality in order to make more targeted policy prescriptions. The importance of having a well functioning nancial system for reducing the level of inequality within a country highlights the priority that nancial development should have on policy makers' agenda. 
